Osservatorio Strategico Mediterraneo Allargato

Key takeaways

➢Gulf monarchies, particularly Qatar and Saudi Arabia, are very likely to pursue investments in Syria, aiming to prevent economic collapse and avert the outbreak of a renewed civil conflict.

➢Turkish diplomatic and economic involvement in Syria is likely to intensify, with the dual objective of preserving its regional influence and advancing strategic economic interests.

➢Russia’s influence in Syria is very likely to decline, as shown by its loss of strategic assets like the port of Tartus; it is similarly unlikely that Russia will be excluded entirely from Syria’s future.

➢Syrian authorities are likely to continue engaging in negotiations with Israel, with the United Arab Emirates playing a mediating role.

➢Salafi-jihadist factions operating within Syria are unlikely to support rapprochement with Western actors, potentially heightening domestic security threats.

➢Internal ethnic tensions and the fragmentation of militias are likely to remain persistent sources of instability, despite ongoing external support for reconstruction efforts.

Latest development

On May 23, the U.S. Treasury Department issued General License 25 (GL25), effectively lifting several key restrictions under the Syrian Sanctions Regulations. The move follows President Donald Trump’s pledge earlier in May to support Syria’s post-war reconstruction through steps toward economic normalisation. The license authorises transactions involving Syria’s interim government, led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa. It includes the Central Bank of Syria, state-owned enterprises, and previously sanctioned entities such as Syrian Arab Airlines and the Four Seasons Hotel in Damascus.

Concurrently, Secretary of State Marco Rubio issued a 180-day waiver under the Caesar Act, suspending its applicability to facilitate investments in essential sectors such as energy, water, sanitation, and humanitarian infrastructure. Rubio described the measure as “the first step in delivering on the President’s vision of a new relationship between Syria and the United States.”^[1]

The announcement follows Trump’s meeting of May 14 with al-Sharaa in Riyadh, during which Washington conditioned further sanctions relief on key Syrian commitments, including the expulsion of foreign militants, deportation of certain Palestinian groups, and cooperation in counter-ISIS operations.^[2]

Background
On December 8, 2024, the regime of Bashar al-Assad formally collapsed following the fall of Damascus to the rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). The group’s leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa—previously known by his nom de guerre, Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani—emerged as the de facto head of Syria’s transitional authority. Formerly affiliated with Jabhat al-Nusra, the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda that later evolved into ISIS, al-Sharaa has since publicly distanced himself from jihadist ideology and the Islamic State’s methods, seeking instead to portray himself as a “moderate combatant” and a legitimate political figure.

In the immediate aftermath of Assad’s fall, al-Sharaa undertook a strategic repositioning of HTS and initiated a transitional governance process. He appointed Mohamed al-Bashir as interim Prime Minister and swiftly dissolved both the 2012 constitution and the Baathist-era parliament. Rebel forces were integrated into a newly formed military structure, and a National Dialogue was convened in February 2025 to address institutional reform, economic recovery, and civil liberties. However, the process was criticised for its limited inclusiveness, notably excluding the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and key minority groups such as the Druze and Alawites. On March 13, al-Sharaa signed a Constitutional Declaration outlining a five-year transitional period. The 44-article charter designates Islamic jurisprudence as the principal source of legislation while also pledging to uphold civil liberties, women’s rights, and the separation of powers.

At the international level, al-Sharaa has acted swiftly to consolidate political legitimacy. In early February, he met with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, signalling a clear break from Iran and the Assad-era “Resistance Axis.” Subsequent meetings with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Emirati President Mohammed bin Zayed further underscored a strategic pivot toward the Gulf and Ankara. Despite this foreign policy realignment, the domestic situation remains unstable. Ethnoreligious violence has continued, particularly targeting the Alawite community in Latakia, where transitional forces were accused of sectarian reprisals in early March 2025. Similar incidents have been reported in Sweida and Quneitra, where members of the Druze minority have faced targeted raids and extrajudicial killings by units affiliated with former HTS commanders.^[3] 

Estimates for Syria’s reconstruction range from $250 to $400 billion, a figure that dwarfs the current value of the national economy, which the World Bank estimates at approximately $21 billion, following an 83% contraction between 2010 and 2024. According to Central Bank Governor Abdulkader Husrieh, the lifting of international sanctions would enable Syria to rejoin the global financial system, facilitate the release of frozen assets, and improve access to external funding.^[4]

Intelligence Assessment & Strategic Implications

• It is very likely that the Gulf monarchies, particularly Qatar and Saudi Arabia, will continue to invest in Syria. This trend reflects both their concern over potential economic and political collapse, which could further destabilise the region, and a broader shift in regional alliances. Two key developments support this assessment. First, despite its historical opposition to Assad’s regime, Qatar has pledged to finance the salaries of Syrian public sector employees, committing $29 million per month over three months—signalling a new course in Doha’s approach to Syria and a pragmatic shift toward engagement.^[5] Second, the Syrian government has finalised an agreement with Qatar’s UCC to double the country’s electricity supply, marking an essential step in post-war recovery, given that most areas currently receive only two to three hours of electricity per day.^[6] Additionally, on May 16, the World Bank confirmed receipt of a joint $15.5 million payment from Qatar and Saudi Arabia toward Syria’s sovereign debt. This contribution enables Syria to regain access to vital credit lines from both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, thereby creating the conditions for launching multilateral reconstruction initiatives.^[7]
• Turkish diplomatic involvement and support will likely increase, as evidenced by its consistent backing of Syria’s transitional government since its inception. Several developments point in this direction. First, in the lead-up to the Trump–al-Sharaa meeting, Ankara had exerted pressure on Washington to initiate dialogue with the new leadership in Damascus. Notably, the Turkish government later welcomed the partial lifting of Western sanctions on Syria as a positive step. Second, underscoring Türkiye’s commitment to Syria’s reconstruction, on May 20, a delegation of Turkish investors met with the Syrian Minister of Energy to discuss potential cooperation in the oil and energy sectors.^[8] These initiatives form part of a broader strategy to expand Turkish regional influence while also working to prevent Syria’s collapse under the weight of economic crisis and increasing political fragmentation.
• Russia’s influence in Syria is likely to decline, though it is unlikely to be entirely excluded or left without a role. Current evidence points to the partialmarginalisation of Moscow, particularly through the loss of strategic assets. On May 16, 2025, the Syrian Port Authority announced the signing of a new Memorandum of Understanding with the Emirati firm DP World for the management and development of the port of Tartous, involving an $800 million investment. This agreement effectively replaces the Russian company STG Engineering, which had signed a 49-year contract in 2019 valued at $500 million.^[9] While Russia continues to maintain a limited military presence in TartousandHmeimim, which will also be subject to renegotiation, its ability to shape the strategic and economic trajectory of post-Assad Syria appears increasingly constrained. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that Russia will be excluded entirely from Syria’s future. Indeed, on May 19, the SyrianCentral Bank confirmed that it would continue cooperating with a Russian firm under an existing agreement to print Syrian currency. The statement explicitly denied recent reports claiming that Damascus was negotiating alternative arrangements with firms in the UAE and Germany, suggesting that Syria intends to maintain a pragmatic and ambivalent posture, preserving relations with Moscow while seeking broader economic engagement.^[10] This interpretation is reinforced by two key developments: the Central Bank’s official denial and the April 25 meeting in Baku, Azerbaijan, between the heads of Russian and Syrian intelligence, which clearly signals a shared intention to preserve, at least partially, the bilateral relationship with the Russian Federation.
• Salafi-jihadist factions are unlikely to accept the normalisation of relations and rapprochement with Western powers.Growing dissatisfaction is evident among these groups: although many supported al-Sharaa’s rise to power, they now regard the current overtures to the West with deep suspicion, particularly following President Trump’s meeting in May. The emergence of new ideological fractures within the broader Islamist front, triggered by the leadership’s diplomatic orientation, poses a concrete threat to internal cohesion. These divisions may catalyse conflict dynamics that could prove difficult to contain. When combined with pre-existing ethnic tensions, such as persistent discrimination against Alawite and Druze communities, the risk of renewed civil conflict cannot be ruled out.^[11]
• Syrian authorities will likely continue the process of negotiations with Israel, mediated by the United Arab Emirates, with the dual objective of preventing conflict and exploring the possibility of normalising bilateral relations. On the Syrian side, the talks have been led by senior security official Ahmad al-Dalati, who was appointed governor of Quneitra, the province bordering the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, following the fall of Bashar al-Assad. In late May, Dalati was also assigned responsibility for security in the southern province of Sweida, home to a significant Druze population. The negotiations aim to reduce the risk of escalation, limit Israeli incursions, and potentially re-establish the terms of the 1974 ceasefire agreement, which set up a UN-monitored buffer zone in the Golan Heights.^[12] On its side, Israel will likely continue to participate in these indirect talks. However, its strategic objective appears to be the preservation of a fragile and fragmented Syrian state, kept outside Iran’s sphere of influence and, to the extent possible, containing Türkiye’s regional ambitions.

Conclusion

The stability of post-Assad Syria will likely remain fragile and contingent on the transitional government’s ability to balance international openness with domestic cohesion. Gulf monarchies will very likely continue playing a key role in shaping Syria’s political and economic trajectory, alongside Türkiye. Russia’s influence is undergoing partial marginalisation and is likely to continue declining, though a complete exclusion remains unlikely. Syria’s serious need for investments for reconstruction makes continued cooperation with Moscow a pragmatic necessity. The new Syrian leadership faces a complex challenge: rebuilding resilient and cohesive institutions, restoring internal stability, and reintegrating the country into the international system and global financial networks. To achieve these objectives, Damascus must forge new alliances and navigate a landscape marked by contradictions and competing interests.

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