Osservatorio Strategico Mediterraneo Allargato

Key takeaways

➢ The SMD Agreement will almost certainly deepen Saudi–Pakistani military integration, holding a symbolic value, too.

➢ Saudi Arabia is likely to use the pact as a hedge against declining U.S. security guarantees.Pakistan is likely to leverage the agreement to strengthen its legitimacy in the Islamic world and secure Saudi economic backing.

➢ The timing, shortly after Israel’s strike on Doha, is very likely to reinforce Gulf perceptions of Israel as a destabilising actor that needs to be deterred and a menace to their national security.

➢ Indo–Saudi relations are unlikely to remain unchanged, undermining trust and complicating projects such as the IMEC corridor.

➢ The SMDA is very likely to encourage other Gulf monarchies to explore similar agreements, reflecting waning confidence in U.S. security guarantees.

Latest Developments

On September 17, 2025, in Riyadh, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman signed the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA). The accord establishes a binding framework of mutual defence, stipulating that an attack against either state must be treated as aggression against both.

While the full text remains undisclosed, official communiqués emphasise the objective of “developing defence cooperation and strengthening joint deterrence against external threats.” Saudi officials underscored that the agreement encompasses “all military means,” a wording that has raised speculation over the inclusion of nuclear cooperation. Pakistani representatives offered reassurances that the nuclear dimension is excluded, reiterating that Islamabad’s nuclear arsenal is reserved solely for deterrence against India. Nevertheless, Saudi statements suggested that the pact extends beyond conventional defence, pointing to enhanced intelligence sharing and advanced military cooperation. ^[1]

The timing of the signing, less than ten days after Israel’s September 9 attack on Doha, has conferred additional urgency and political weight on the agreement. Although negotiations had been ongoing for nearly two years, the agreement was widely interpreted as a direct response to shifting regional security dynamics and to the perception of waning U.S. commitment to Gulf security.

Background

Historically, Saudi–Pakistani relations have been prolific. Formal ties date back to the 1951 Treaty of Friendship, followed by Riyadh’s consistent financial and political support for Islamabad throughout the Cold War. ^[2] The cooperation intensified after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which reshaped Gulf security dynamics and encouraged Saudi Arabia to anchor Pakistan more firmly within its strategic orbit. In 1983, Islamabad deployed a military contingent to the Kingdom and has always been committed to protecting the holy sites of Mecca and Medina. Since then, Pakistani forces have periodically trained and operated alongside Saudi units under bilateral arrangements. Additionally, King Faisal was, since the very beginning, one of the key actors in financing the development of Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities. Riyadh, in turn, has repeatedly provided economic aid, often cushioning Pakistan during financial crises. ^[3] The latest loan was extended in December 2024, amounting to $3 billion, in the form of a central bank deposit, to boost Pakistan’s foreign exchange reserves and stabilise its economy. ^[4]

The 2025 context sharpened the need for renewed commitments. On the one hand, Pakistan faces severe domestic fragility, with an increase of 13% in public debt in 2025 reaching 80.5 trillion, soaring inflation, ^[5] and heightened tensions with India, which reached the highest peak of violence in May 2025, facing a rival that has a seven times larger defence budget.

On the other hand, Saudi Arabia has witnessed in a few months two direct attacks on Qatar: one from Iran on June 23, 2025, and one from Israel on September 9, 2025, shaping its perception of Israel as a threat and redefining its security needs.

Intelligence Assessment & Strategic Implications

• The SMDA will almost certainly deepen Saudi–Pakistani military integration while also holding a symbolic dimension. Public readouts emphasise a clause treating aggression against either party as aggression against both, shifting cooperation from ad-hoc training and deployments to a formal deterrence framework. The pact’s language, coupled with both sides’ decades-long security ties, indicates movement toward more structured planning and exercises. As it encompasses “all military means,” it is likely that in the event of an attack, nuclear deterrence could be employed as well.
• Saudi Arabia is likely using the SMDA as a strategic hedge against the erosion of U.S. security guarantees. Riyadh’s gradual loss of confidence in Washington’s willingness to defend Gulf interests has prompted diversification of its defence portfolio. The need to seek out other security partners almost certainly stems from the inability, or unwillingness, of Washington to control Israel’s power projection and Saudi Arabia’s military ineffectiveness in guaranteeing its security. The former element has been demonstrated by the September 9, 2025, direct attack on Qatar, a close U.S. ally, signalling that Israel is now perceived as a threat to the Gulf regional security and needs to be deterred. The latter refers to the military failures experienced by Saudi Arabia in its Yemen campaign against Houthis, which led to the capture of the capital city, Sana’a, by the rebels. Additionally, the other attack launched this year against Qatar came from Iran; Saudi Arabia has consistently stated that it would acquire nuclear capabilities as soon as Iran develops the bomb. It is therefore likely that this agreement serves as a security shield against both Iran and Israel.
• Pakistan is likely to exploit the SMDA to assert its status as a central actor in the Islamic world and to secure renewed Saudi financial backing. Facing an acute economic crisis, with reserves below $5 billion and heavy IMF dependence, Islamabad sees the pact as an economic lifeline. It is also likely that Pakistan agreed to such a framework to strengthen its deterrence against India, following the most intense phase of conflict in decades, the May Operation Sindoor,  and in light of India’s superior military capabilities.
• The timing of the signing, less than ten days after Israel’s September 9 attack on Doha, is very likely to reinforce Gulf perceptions of Israel as a destabilising actor. The incidents underscored the vulnerability of Gulf states and the inability of existing security arrangements to provide credible deterrence. Riyadh’s response, through the SMDA, is likely to signal an intent to build autonomous regional deterrence, potentially including cooperation in the nuclear domain, early-warning systems, missile capabilities, and counter-drone technologies where Pakistan holds operational experience. ^[6]
• Indo–Saudi relations are unlikely to remain stable, and mutual trust will likely erode, complicating flagship initiatives such as the India–Middle East–Europe Corridor (IMEC). New Delhi interprets Riyadh’s strategic embrace of Islamabad as an implicit realignment that weakens India’s role in Gulf security, and has stressed “mutual interests and sensitivities,” signalling caution. ^[7]
• The SMDA is very likely to encourage other Gulf monarchies, notably the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Oman, to explore comparable bilateral frameworks. Regional governments increasingly view U.S. protection as selective and conditional, prompting experimentation with minilateral security architectures involving regional or extra-regional partners. Qatar is not unlikely[1]  to explore closer cooperation in defence with Turkey, as President Erdogan, right after the attack, has discussed possible joint steps in response to it with Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani. ^[8] However, no concrete agreement has emerged yet. The Riyadh–Islamabad model is likely to act as a template for adapting Gulf deterrence, signalling the gradual decentralisation of Gulf security away from a single external guarantor.

Conclusion

The SMDA will likely strengthen Saudi–Pakistani defence cooperation while signalling a gradual diversification of Gulf security beyond U.S. guarantees. Pakistan has likely acted to gain a more dominant position within the Islamic world, whereas Saudi Arabia is likely seeking to reinforce deterrence against both Iran and Israel. Indo–Saudi relations are likely to experience sustained friction, though not a complete rupture. Over time, the SMDA is likely to contribute to a more distributed and autonomous Gulf security architecture, seeking both regional and international partners, following a policy line shaped by pragmatism.

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