Osservatorio Strategico Mediterraneo Allargato

Key takeaways

➢ The Netanyahu government will very likely prolong military presence in Gaza, driven by its objective of totally dismantling Hamas’ military capabilities.

➢ If Hamas is militarily neutralised, postwar governance in Gaza under Netanyahu will likely exclude not only Hamas but also other Palestinian factions, with prolonged IDF control the most probable short-term outcome.

➢ It is more likely than not that alternative “day-after” scenarios could see a Palestinian-led administration supported by U.S. and Arab mediators. Still, Hamas is almost certain to be excluded.

➢ It is likely that, despite declining popular support, Hamas will continue recruiting from Gaza’s devastated population. Meanwhile, it retains resilience as an insurgent force.

Latest development

On September 16, Israel launched a large-scale ground operation in Gaza City. According to the IDF, Gaza City is now considered Hamas’s main stronghold, with 2,000 – 3,000 fighters remaining. ^[1] As part of “Operation Tanks of Gideon II,” the IDF now claims control over 40% of the territory and says conditions are set for a full-scale occupation of Gaza City. The battle for the city is expected to be prolonged, with Hamas military commander Izz al-Din al-Haddad warning fighters to prepare for months of combat. ^[2]

Residents were ordered to evacuate through the al-Rashid coastal road, the only permitted route, though most of the Strip has already been declared a military zone. This has left restricted portions of Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis as the only areas still designated for civilian shelter.

The humanitarian impact has fueled renewed international concern. The UN Commission on Human Rights formally declared that Israel has committed genocide in Gaza – the strongest statement so far from a UN body – while EU officials announced plans for tariffs on Israeli imports and sanctions against cabinet members. ^[3]

In the week preceding Gaza’s ground invasion, Israel has also expanded its campaign once again beyond the Strip. On September 9, an unprecedented airstrike targeted Hamas’s negotiating team in Doha. Five Hamas members, including the son of chief negotiator Khalil al-Hayya, were killed alongside a Qatari security officer. However, Hamas claims senior leadership survived. The attack, which prompted strong condemnation from the UN Security Council, was followed by a rare joint emergency session in Doha on September 15th, held by the Arab League and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).

Meanwhile, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio – speaking after he met with Netanyahu in Jerusalem – reaffirmed Washington’s support for Israel while stressing the urgency of a deal focused on hostages and Hamas’s dismantlement. Yet President Trump struck a different tone, and warned Israel to “be careful,” praising Qatar as a “great ally” while criticising the attacks on Doha. ^[4]

Background

Since the collapse of the March ceasefire, Israel has resumed near-continuous bombardments and ground operations while restricting humanitarian aid. Simultaneously, Netanyahu revived plans to divide Gaza through the Morag and Netzarim Corridors, moves that analysts see as designed to fragment the Strip into three security zones.

For Hamas, the war has meant the near-total destruction of its governing structures. Once the de facto authority in Gaza, it has lost senior leaders, institutional capacity, and safe havens abroad – even coming under attack in Tehran and Doha. Classified intelligence from May 2025 estimates that nearly 9,000 Hamas and Islamic Jihad fighters have been killed since the war began, yet representing only a fraction of the over 40.000 estimated active. ^[5] At the same time, this same military data indicates that at least 83% of Palestinians killed were civilians. ^[6]

What remains is an organisation increasingly operating as an insurgency which has abandoned its traditional chain of command in favour of decentralised cells conducting ambushes. ^[7] Hamas’s operations have declined from an estimated 40 per week in late 2023 to roughly 10–15 today, and while this might indeed signal a weakening of the organisation, some observers also say that these new tactics showcase that Hamas is adapting to urban warfare. ^[8]

This comes after diplomatic tracks have repeatedly stalled. Peace talks brokered by Qatar, Egypt, and the U.S. broke down again in July 2025, with no agreement reached on the core issues. Hamas demanded the release of hundreds of Palestinian prisoners, the withdrawal of Israeli troops, and a permanent end to the war in exchange for the release of Israeli hostages. Israel, however, has consistently insisted on Hamas’s complete and unconditional surrender.

Domestically, Netanyahu faces mounting pressure. Hostage families and opposition figures accuse him of deliberately sacrificing their relatives to prolong the war and preserve his political survival while avoiding corruption trials. Meanwhile, business experts warn of an economic and social disruption should the war continue indefinitely. ^[9]

Intelligence Assessment & Strategic Implications

• The Netanyahu government will very likely continue military operations in Gaza. Two main factors explain this trajectory. First, Netanyahu remains determined to eliminate Hamas’s military capabilities. Neither international isolation, domestic protests, nor tensions with Israel’s own military leadership have altered this objective so far. Second, his stance is reinforced by U.S. policy. While Trump has expressed impatience for an end to the war – particularly after the 12-day confrontation with Iran – Washington has refrained from conditioning or halting military aid to Israel. The Trump administration’s ambiguity towards Gaza reflects a desire to secure regional plans without further delay, while avoiding a clear or viable commitment to a postwar plan.

• If the war concludes under the current Israeli government and Hamas is militarily neutralised, postwar governance in Gaza is likely to exclude not only Hamas but all Palestinian factions. Prime Minister Netanyahu has already dismissed U.S. proposals to reinstate the Palestinian Authority, signalling a rejection of Palestinian self-governance in the territory. His primary objectives – maintaining his governing coalition and appeasing far-right partners – suggest that Israel may pursue long-term reoccupation of Gaza alongside expanded settlement activity in the West Bank. These dynamics further diminish the already slim prospects for a future Palestinian state.

• In alternative “day-after” scenarios where Gaza is permitted a Palestinian-led administration, it is almost certain that Hamas will be excluded from governance. It is more likely than not that coordination could be supported by the U.S. and Arab mediators, though American involvement would more likely focus on political leadership and security coordination rather than direct military assistance to Palestinian forces.

• Despite declining popular support, Hamas is likely to continue recruiting from Gaza’s devastated population, especially young males, who carry deep grievances against Israel. The group’s decentralised structure of decision-making, including input from imprisoned members in Israel and West Bank leaders. It is precisely in the West Bank – experts suggest – that the historically marginalised Hamas’s leadership may play a greater role in shaping the group’s future trajectory.^[10]

Conclusion

The conflict has brought Gaza to a critical juncture. Netanyahu’s strategy – prolonged military operations, the exclusion of all Palestinian factions from governance, and potential long-term reoccupation – reflects ongoing efforts to dismantle Hamas, consolidate Israeli control, and further diminish any prospects for a future Palestinian state. Meanwhile, Hamas’s decentralised resilience and continued recruitment indicate that insurgent activity will persist as long as the IDF is militarily present in Gaza.