Osservatorio Strategico Mediterraneo Allargato

Key Takeaways

➢ Violent clashes broke out in Serbia after nine months of peaceful protests, at least 50 people were injured in Vrbas, and tensions spread to other cities.

➢ Demonstrations began after a deadly infrastructure collapse, with protesters demanding early elections, anti-corruption reforms, and recognition of student bodies.

➢ President Vučić and security officials blame protesters for the violence, while critics highlight limits on media freedom, centralised power, and manipulated elections.

➢ Prolonged unrest could inspire opposition movements in the Balkans, worsen Serbia-Kosovo tensions, and undermine Serbia’s EU accession prospects.

➢ Russia is unlikely to intervene, but China seeks stability to protect its investments, while the EU fears potential migration and security spillover.

Latest Development

On August 13, 2025, anti-government protesters and supporters of the current Serbian government clashed. Associated Press reported that protesters have led demonstrations for nine months, and no one had detected any record of violence until last week. ^[1]

The episode on Wednesday the 13th occurred in Novi Sad, northern Serbia. Protesters and government supporters also confronted each other in Vrbas the night before, and clashes expanded to other Serbian cities in the following days. Videos and images circulating online show that supporters threw objects and flares, and protesters responded, rather than protesters attacking. However, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić described the protesters as “real terrorists.” ^[2]

According to Balkan Insights, clashes in Vrbas injured at least 50 people, but officials have not yet provided a precise, comprehensive estimate. President Aleksandar Vučić and Serbian Police Director Dragan Vasiljevic both blame the protesters alone for the violence. Vasiljevic said:

“It was not the supporters of the Serbian Progressive Party who went to someone’s premises, it was not the supporters of the Serbian Progressive Party who attacked someone, or went somewhere to attack someone – they were in front of their [party] premises and someone else came, for some reason, unknown to me, attempting to attack both the people and the premises of the Serbian Progressive Party.”^[3]

Background

Anti-government protests started in November 2024, after the collapse of the rail station canopy in Novi Sad killed 16 people. Many say entrenched corruption in the State infrastructure projects caused the disaster. Protesters want to anticipate a new round of elections instead of waiting for the scheduled one in 2027. They also demand more transparency from the government and free, fair access to political life. Students mostly lead these protests, so they ask for the government to recognise student bodies as legal entities and respect the autonomy of universities. ^[4]

Al Jazeera noted that Serbian protesters have forced a government change before. In 2000, former President Slobodan Milošević was defeated in the election, and people occupied the Parliament until he recognised the defeat and was later arrested and scrutinised at The Hague.^[5] Although nowadays social media access should boost protest activity, today’s protesters have much less support than in 2000. Considering how long the current demonstrations have lasted, protesters are very unlikely to achieve their desired goal soon.

President Vučić co-founded the Serbian Progressive Party (SPS) after splitting from the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) and reshaping it with a more pro-European and pragmatic orientation. On the one hand, he promotes EU accession and initiatives such as Open Balkans. ^[6] On the other hand, protesters denounce the limits he has placed on media freedom, the manipulation of electoral processes, and the highly centralised power structure he controls.

Intelligence Assessment and Strategic Implication

Protests in Serbia concern only domestic politics, but they could still spill over outside the country. If tensions escalate further, they will likely cause regional and international consequences.

• Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia and Montenegro have historically experienced political tensions since the Balkan Wars (1912-1913). Prolonged unrest in Serbia will likely motivate opposition movements in other Balkan states, especially where people accuse governments of corruption and authoritarianism.
• Despite extensive EU mediation, Serbia and Kosovo remain locked in a long-standing dispute. Serbia does not recognise the 2008 Kosovo Declaration of Independence. ^[7] Most ethnic Serbs in Northern Kosovo reject Kosovo’s authority and still consider Belgrade their capital. If violence and unrest in Serbia escalate and persist, President Vučić is likely to implement what Patrick James calls externalising internal crises to consolidate political backing. ^[8] By externalising crises, leaders attempt to transform domestic vulnerability into a unifying narrative of national defence, thereby consolidating political support. Implementing this strategy means escalating tensions with Kosovo to rally nationalist support at home.
• The European Union identified Serbia as a potential candidate in 2003, and Belgrade formally applied in 2009. The 1st Intergovernmental Conference in 2014 signalled the official start of Serbia’s accession negotiations, but the process has stalled many times. ^[9] An escalation of violence in Serbia is likely to raise additional concerns among EU member states, which may see it as a security threat. Today, EU members discuss immigration more than any other issue, and if protests in Serbia turn into widespread violence, migration toward nearby EU states is very likely.
• Beyond EU dynamics, Serbia maintains close ties with both Russia and China. Many protesters denounce the Ministry of Interior for explicitly supporting Russia. President Vučić, however, follows a janus-faced strategy in foreign affairs, treating Serbia as a pragmatic player with both Russia and China.

Russia is very unlikely to play a role in this situation. Historically, Serbia and Russia have pursued their own interests and maintained independence, while staying close through cultural affinities and economic ties. ^[10] In addition, Russia is unlikely to intervene alongside Serbia now, given its priorities, such as ongoing discussions about Ukraine.

China is more likely to push for stability and order in Serbia, given their so-called “ironclad friendship.” China has recently invested in Serbian infrastructure and energy projects, so it has a strong interest in avoiding unrest. ^[11]

• During last week’s demonstrations, local police in Serbia arrested an Italian man living in the country and released him shortly after. The Italian Embassy in Belgrade is strengthening its diplomatic presence and will likely continue monitoring the situation while providing consular support. ^[12]

Conclusion and Recommendations

The persistence of anti-government protests in Serbia highlights deep domestic grievances over corruption, governance, and democratic freedoms. While clashes remain largely contained, their escalation could destabilise the Western Balkans, strain EU integration efforts, and inflame the Serbia-Kosovo dispute. External actors such as the EU and China will continue to play a critical role, with Brussels focused on security risks and migration, and Beijing prioritising economic stability. Monitoring the protests’ trajectory and assessing Vučić’s potential use of external tensions to consolidate internal power will be essential to anticipating both domestic and regional outcomes.