Osservatorio Strategico Mediterraneo Allargato

Latest Development

On May 25, 2025, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) militants attacked a military position of the Nigerien Defence and Security Forces (FDS) in the Tahoua Region in Niger.

Military sources report that for at least three hours, the military personnel of the Eknewan base have been under heavy fire and that the ISGS occupied the base, seizing vehicles, weapons and a large amount of ammunition.^[1] The latest news report at least 41 deaths among the army personnel, and an undefined number is missing. ^[2]

Background

The attack follows others that have been perpetrated against the FDS in the recent past, notably over the past eight months. On September 18, 2024, the same base was attacked, and in that circumstance, 24 soldiers were killed and ISGS forces seized vehicles, weapons and a large amount of ammunition.^[3] One month before the Eknewan attack, on April 25, 2025, a military patrol was attacked, and twelve soldiers were killed by jihadists dressed as civilians near the Mali border.^[4]

The ISGS is the local branch of the Islamic State, which was self-proclaimed after a schism from the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) in May 2015. Yet, the leader, Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahraoui, was formally recognised by ISIS only after “the pledge of allegiance (bay’a) to its leader Abubakr al-Baghdadi in October 2016.” ^[5] The group started operating in western Niger and north-eastern Mali and the first noteworthy strike was against a high-security prison near the Niger capital, Niamey, which detained at least 100 jihadists. ^[6] Still, the attack was a complete failure. Nevertheless, through the following years, the group was able to recruit many fighters among the local populations where it operates and strengthened ties with the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). Since 2019, the two groups have accused each other of treason and have been at war ever since, clashing more than 100 times in just the first two years. ^[7]

The prominent state actor in the region, France, has quickly reacted to the increasing power of ISGS, declaring it “enemy number one” in January 2020 and conducting at least 70 operations that year, killing more than 430 jihadist fighters. ^[8] On September 16, 2021, the French President Emmanuel Macron announced that Walid al-Sahraoui had been killed one month before, using a drone.

Foreign involvement in counterterrorism operations has evolved over the years, particularly following the July 2023 coup d’état. The French, German, and American troops were withdrawn from the country in the summer of 2024, and Italy is the only country still present, with 250 troops as of July 2024. The new Junta, led by General Abdourahamane Tiani, has increasingly turned towards Russia, Türkiye and Iran for security purposes. ^[9]

Intelligence Assessment & Strategic Implications

• The ISGS is very likely to expand its operations in Niger, primarily in the vicinity of the capital, Niamey. The post-coup counterterrorism approach has demonstrated a total failure because it has prioritised “undisciplined counterterrorism operations over a robust security force presence”, which affected only the civilians, allowing the terrorist to amplify their recruiting base. ^[10]
• The ISGS is likely to use the seized military equipment to organise other strikes, highlighting that the killing of Walid al-Sahraoui has not affected the willingness to fight. After two equal operations against the same army base, the terrorists will likely pursue the same kind of actions but against a different target.
• The Nigerien junta is unlikely to turn to Moscow to increase its presence through Private Military Companies to conduct counterterrorist operations. Indeed, the scarce results delivered by the Russian presence in the Sahel are insufficient to justify a larger presence. Russian mercenaries have also been accused of violating human rights, and “Russia’s limited economic investments in the region” seem to indicate an opportunistic approach.^[11] Furthermore, Russia is under increasing international pressure due to the Ukrainian situation, and its defence expenditures are already being invested in reallocating equipment from Syria to Libya. For these reasons, Moscow is very unlikely to deepen its commitment.
• The United States is unlikely to seize the opportunity to play a key role in the region due to the Trump administration’s distancing from interventionist policies. The US has a competitive advantage because it combines “security assistance with long-term investments in governance, infrastructure, and economic development.”^[12]. The White House is likely to pursue the pledge made by President Trump in Saudi Arabia to stop the nation-building interventions.
• Italy is almost certain to maintain its presence in Niger and is likely to deploy additional troops, bringing the total to 500 units, the maximum allowed by the Italian Parliament. On December 17, 2024, the two countries signed the “Cooperation Plan 2025”, which foresees eleven joint military exercises. Niger is a key country on the migration routes to the mediterranean, and Italy is very unlikely to abandon its prominent position, especially with this government.
• The 5’000 troops allocated by Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso in the framework of the Alliance of Sahelian States are unlikely to succeed in their struggle against terrorism if not supported by external forces.

Conclusion

The instability of the Sahel region, besides the weak political institutions, is due to ethnic clashes and terrorism. The latter is on the rise in the last one year in Niger where ISGS’ jihadists have repeatedly attacked the FDS.

The terrorist group is very likely to expand its operations, and the regime is unlikely to stop them, even in the framework of the Alliance of Sahelian States. Moscow is unlikely to increase its presence in the region due to international pressures and other priorities. Furthermore, the US is unlikely to capitalise on the region’s needs to expand its presence. Finally, Italy is very likely to be the only Western country with a permanent military presence in the country. 

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