Osservatorio Strategico Mediterraneo Allargato

Key Takeaways:

➢ The dissolution of the PKK’s organisational structure, announced on May 7, 2025, marks the formal end of its armed struggle against the Turkish state, following Abdullah Öcalan’s call to disarm.

➢ Armed violence in southeastern Turkey is likely to decline, though splinter groups could sustain low-level militancy.

➢ Turkey is almost certain to continue military operations in Iraq and Syria, citing ongoing security threats from Kurdish actors.

➢ Nationalist and anti-Kurdish rhetoric will very likely persist in Turkish politics, especially ahead of upcoming elections.

Latest Developments:

On May 7, the final declaration from the 12th PKK Congress was announced, marking the dissolution of the organisational structure of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and the end of the armed struggle against the Turkish state.

The announcement came several months after the group’s imprisoned leader, Abdullah Öcalan, urged the PKK’s members to disarm on February 27th, 2025.

Background:

The Kurds are an Iranic ethnic minority native to the mountainous region of Kurdistan in Western Asia, and are currently divided among Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey. They represent one-fifth of Turkey’s population of 84 million and are the largest non-Turkic ethnic minority in Türkiye. Due to its entity, the potential united Kurdish political force has been recognised as destabilising for the Ankara government since its modern institutionalisation in 1923 with the Treaty of Lausanne. The Turkish state has attempted to defuse centrifugal impulses through an imposed assimilation of Kurdish communities in the country. ^[1]

The unresolved tension and desperation of the Kurdish population rapidly spilled over into violence: with the founding in 1978 of the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), an organisation recognised as a terrorist one by Türkiye, the United States, and the European Union, demands for greater Kurdish autonomy or independence became violent. The conflict between the PKK and Turkish forces has resulted in more than 40’000 dead following military operations by the Turkish army and PKK terrorist attacks. While multiple efforts to stabilise the conflict have been made, including a cease-fire in 1993, all of them have collapsed, resulting in the continuation of violence. A round of peace talks began in 2011, but war continued in mid-2015, with each side blaming the other for the failure.

Beyond Türkiye, the PKK has also built influence in neighbouring regions to promote its broader vision of Kurdish autonomy and independence. In Northern Iraq, it has established its operational hub, due to the Iraqi central government’s incapacity to control its territory. ^[2] Türkiye has conducted frequent cross-border airstrikes and special operations in this area. In Syria, the PKK benefited from the civil war’s chaos, supporting ideologically aligned groups like the YPG and PYD, which dominate the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES). Though the YPG was central to the US-backed fight against ISIS, Türkiye has viewed it as a PKK offshoot and has launched military operations against it. ^[3] Finally, in Iran, the PJAK, the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan, ideologically aligned with the PKK, operates along the Iran-Iraq border and has clashed with Iranian security forces. Iran has occasionally cooperated with Türkiye in targeting cross-border Kurdish insurgents, despite mutual distrust.

The numerous occasions in which Türkiye has opposed the affirmation of Kurdish movements across the Middle East can be traced to a more profound antagonism towards Kurdish communities that various historical, ideological and geopolitical reasons can explain. With the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Ottoman pluralism was substituted by a rigid national identity based on “Turkishness,” a concept that was never fully defined by ethnicity, language or culture and thus an ambiguous identity that excluded minorities. The Kurds, the largest non-Turkish ethnic group, were labelled as “Mountain Turks” for decades, because their nationalist aspirations are seen as a contradiction to the unitary Turkish identity, particularly since Kurds are not ethnically Turkic. ^[4] Turkish governments have therefore long feared that granting Kurdish autonomy would set a precedent for secession, leading to the fragmentation of the country along ethnic lines. ^[5] The impossibility of recognising the Kurdish identity is therefore strictly linked to the absence of a pluralistic model in their state ideology, which threatened the coherence of the Turkish nation-state project.

The timing of the PKK’s dissolution is closely tied to renewed messaging from its imprisoned leader, Abdullah Öcalan, who has reportedly urged the group to abandon armed struggle in favour of political engagement. Öcalan, captured by Turkish intelligence in Nairobi, Kenya, in 1999, has since been held in near-total isolation on İmralı Island in the Sea of Marmara. Though cut off from the public for years, reports of his February 2025 appeal to end violence suggest that Ankara may have allowed indirect communication to test the viability of de-escalation.

Intelligence Assessment & Strategic Implications:

• Türkiye will likely witness a time of reduced armed violence, with a notable decline in armed clashes in the Turkish southeast, especially if splinter factions do not mobilise independently. 
• However, nationalist and anti-Kurdish rhetoric will very likely persist in Turkish politics, ahead of upcoming electoral cycles, building from the political struggle arising from the massive protests following  Ekrem İmamoğlu‘s arrest and using anti-Kurdish sentiment as a unifying force.
• The Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) or other Kurdish political actors will likely attempt to leverage this moment for political negotiation. Still, the absence of trust and past crackdowns make significant concessions by Ankara unlikely.
• Despite the PKK’s declaration, Türkiye will remotely cease completely its cross-border operations in Northern Iraq, citing threats from residual elements. Clashes between the PKK and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) will likely decrease, though a reduction in Turkish drone strikes is unlikely. Türkiye will almost certainly maintain military outposts in the region, signalling enduring security priorities over diplomatic reassurances.
• In Syria, Turkish operations in the north of the country remain likely, especially in the absence of concrete structural change within the Syrian Democratic Forces. 
• The PKK’s political messaging abroad, especially in Germany, Belgium, and Sweden, will likely pivot from militancy to advocacy for Kurdish rights. However, fundraising and propaganda activities are very likely to continue under affiliated civil society groups, especially if the Turkish government continues to suppress peaceful expressions of Kurdish identity.
• Hardline cadres, particularly from the PKK’s military wing, the People’s Defence Forces (HPG), will likely reject the central leadership’s decision. If alternative structures like PJAK or new local militias emerge, a shift from centralised to fragmented militancy is likely. This would complicate counterterrorism efforts across Iraq, Iran, and Syria as the PKK’s traditional command and control erode.

Conclusion:

The dissolution of the PKK’s formal structure signifies a historic shift in one of the Middle East’s longest-running insurgencies: while this development opens a potential window for de-escalation within Turkey, it does not equate to a complete cessation of Kurdish militancy or political tension. Ankara remains deeply distrustful of Kurdish political aspirations and continues to define national security in exclusively territorial terms. Without a parallel transformation in Turkish state policy and greater inclusion of Kurdish identity into the political mainstream, the risk of renewed radicalisation, especially among hardline factions or in response to state repression, will remain. Regionally, Turkey’s military posture is unlikely to soften, and the broader Kurdish movement may transition into a more fragmented, decentralised form, presenting new challenges to both regional stability and international diplomatic engagement.