Osservatorio Strategico Mediterraneo Allargato

Key Takeaways

➢ It is more likely than not that Jordan will attempt to outlaw the IAF following its ban on the Muslim Brotherhood, aligning with regional allies Saudi Arabia and the UAE in a broader effort to suppress political Islam. It is likely that public backlash may emerge, driven more by concerns over shrinking political freedoms and Jordan’s stance on Palestine than by support for the MB.

➢ It is very likely that Jordan’s intensified crackdown on the MB is strategically timed ahead of Trump’s visit to the Middle East. The country aims to secure renewed U.S. economic backing while reinforcing its regional role as a strategic ally.

➢ It is almost certain that Jordan will maintain strong cooperation with Israel, particularly for vital water supply and joint security efforts in the West Bank and along volatile borders with Iraq and Syria.

➢ It is very likely that, despite close security ties, Jordan will publicly toughen its stance toward the Netanyahu government, especially in light of Israeli far-right annexation rhetoric regarding Gaza and the West Bank.

Latest development

On April 23, Jordanian authorities officially banned the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). Interior Minister Mazin Al-Faraya announced at a press conference that the group’s assets had been confiscated and a media ban on all MB-related content would be enforced.^[1] Security forces subsequently raided locations linked to both the MB and its political wing, the Islamic Action Front (IAF).

This action followed the April 15 arrest of 16 MB members, after Jordan’s General Intelligence Department claimed to have foiled a terrorist plot involving four cells allegedly tied to the Brotherhood. Some suspects reportedly confessed to receiving training in Lebanon and foreign-supplied equipment. Officials expressed concerns about potential coordination with Hamas and Hezbollah, and possible links to Iran.^[2] Meanwhile, the MB has denied any involvement.

Following the April 16 arrests, Jordanian authorities also banned weekly pro-Gaza demonstrations, marking the first such prohibition since October 7.^[3]

Background

The crackdown on the MB in Jordan is not unexpected and marks the culmination of years of rising tensions. As early as 2020, Jordan’s Court of Cassation ordered the group’s dissolution—a decision never fully enforced, though the IAF was allowed to continue to operate.^[4] Since the outbreak of the war in Gaza, these tensions have intensified, reflecting both Jordan’s growing unease with political Islam and the narrowing space for political opposition.

In the September 2024 parliamentary elections, the IAF emerged as the most significant opposition force. Since then, the MB has sharply criticised the government, particularly over its perceived inaction in support of Palestinians.^[5] The Brotherhood has indeed been a leading organiser of pro-Gaza protests, where Hamas flags and slogans have appeared.^[6] This vocal alignment with Hamas—a group banned from Jordan since 1999—has alarmed the security establishment.

More concerning for Amman is suspected Iranian involvement. Tehran and its proxies are believed to be behind rising cross-border smuggling of weapons and drugs through Jordan, destined for criminal groups in Israel or the West Bank.^[7] Moreover, Houthi attacks in the Red Sea—another proxy action—have slashed Aqaba’s port traffic by 23% in early 2024, further straining Jordan’s economy.^[8] While Jordan and Iran have long had strained relations, hostilities have deepened since the Gaza conflict began. Additionally, Jordan has reportedly assisted Israel in tracking Iranian missile activity, further drawing Tehran’s ire.

Despite recent strains with the U.S. and Israel, due to U.S. tariffs and reduced aid on which Amman strongly relies, Jordan seeks to maintain these strategic ties. Jordan depends heavily on Israeli water and gas: Israel supplies 100 million cubic meters of water annually, and a 2016 gas deal still covers about 40% of Jordan’s needs.^[9]

Intelligence Assessment & Strategic Implications

• More likely than not, Jordan will attempt to outlaw the IAF. While officially framed as a national security measure, the move aligns with the interests of key allies, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, both firm opponents of the Muslim Brotherhood. Some analysts suggest this reflects coordinated pressure from Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and possibly Israel.^[10]

• If the IAF is banned, it is likely that Jordan faces public backlash. However, while the MB’s electoral success has lent it some legitimacy, discontent is more likely to stem from perceptions of shrinking political freedoms, particularly regarding the Palestinian question.

• Jordan’s crackdown on the MB is very likely aimed at aligning with U.S. regional interests ahead of President Trump’s visit to the Middle East. Alongside Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Jordan appears eager to present a unified front against political Islam. Amman hopes to restore U.S. economic support, which was suspended during the Gaza war, and hence needs to reassert its strategic importance as an ally in the region. This is particularly crucial after Trump’s controversial suggestion that Jordan or Egypt host displaced Palestinians—a scenario that would pose a significant threat to Jordan’s demographic and political stability while also inflaming public anger.^[11]

• It is almost certain that Jordan will seek to maintain and strengthen its cooperation with Israel, primarily for water and security. As early as 2024, Israel supplied Jordan with 100 million cubic meters of water annually, a vital resource for one of the world’s most water-scarce nations. Military and intelligence cooperation also remains critical, particularly in monitoring instability in the West Bank. Simultaneously, increased activity by Iran-backed militias along Jordan’s Iraqi and Syrian borders is already stretching security forces. Hence, any shift of resources toward the West Bank could leave these other frontiers dangerously exposed.

• However, it is very likely that Jordan will adopt a harsher stance toward the Netanyahu government over Gaza and the West Bank. The Jordanian security establishment sees Israeli annexation efforts, like Finance Minister Smotrich’s November announcement, as a potential act of war.^[12] Far-right Israeli rhetoric and renewed Gaza offensives risk inflaming public opinion and reactivating militant cells, both in Jordan and the West Bank. As a result, Amman must publicly express indignation to avoid domestic unrest, even as it continues behind-the-scenes cooperation with Israel.

Conclusion

Jordan is likely to escalate its crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood and the IAF, in line with the broader regional effort led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE to suppress political Islam, however, likely causing domestic backlash. This strategy is very likely tied to President Trump’s upcoming visit, as Amman seeks to reaffirm its strategic value to the U.S. and secure renewed economic support. At the same time, Jordan is almost certain to preserve close cooperation with Israel on water access and regional security, especially regarding threats from Iran and its proxies. Nevertheless, it is very likely that Jordan will publicly adopt a tougher tone toward the Netanyahu government to contain growing public frustration and prevent unrest.

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