Key Takeaways
➢ Russia is rapidly shifting military assets from Syria to eastern Libya post-Assad regime collapse, which is crucial for maintaining Mediterranean power projection.
➢ General Khalifa Haftar has granted Russia access to strategic military facilities in Cyrenaica, including the Maaten al-Sarra base in southern Libya and the port of Tobruk.
➢ Russian influence is growing in the Sahel’s unstable regions, with African Corps PMC enhancing Moscow’s security leverage across Libya.
➢ The renovation of the Maaten al-Sarra base will create a strategic hub for Russian operations in Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Sudan and signal long-term commitment.
➢ Russia’s expanding control threatens European access to critical African resources, including gold and uranium, complicating Europe’s energy diversification.
Latest Development
On February 20, 2025, Libyan sources confirmed to Agenzia Nova that the trip to Belarus by Khalifa Haftar’s sons, Saddam and Khaled, was connected to the negotiations between the leader of the Libyan National Army militias and Moscow for the handover of the Tobruk airbase to Russia. This confirmed the recent movements of assets and installations from Russian bases in Syria to those in eastern Libya.[1]
The collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria has forced the Kremlin to reconsider its foreign projection. Moscow is redeploying military forces stationed at its bases in Tartus and Hmeimim, which are still present on Syrian territory. In this context, Russia has decided to implement its Libyan bases, which is necessary for the Kremlin to maintain a presence in North Africa. However, Moscow considers the necessity of the Libyan bases vital for the continuity of its foreign projection on the continent.
Background
Following the collapse of Gaddafi’s regime, Libya was fragmented into two spheres of influence: one in the Tripoli area and the other in the Benghazi area. Cyrenaica region, militarily controlled by the militias of Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army, has consolidated its position and established diplomatic relations with the Russian Federation, particularly in the politico-military domain. For several years, military diplomacy has been the leading Russian strategic tool to gain access to strategic hubs and vital logistical positions for power projection in the area. Russia aims to expand its operations into other African countries and consolidate positions previously held by the former Wagner Group.
Operations concerning Libyan bases accelerated following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian regime. This created uncertainty over Moscow’s ability to maintain and sustain its presence at the Tartus and Hmeimim bases, which hastened the transfer of forces to eastern Libya. According to various open-source reports, by mid-December 2024, Moscow had already transferred troops and equipment to eastern Libya.[2]
In this scenario, relations between Haftar and Moscow have deepened. The Libyan general has benefited from the Syrian bases serving as the bridgeheads for Russia’s projection into Africa. According to Bloomberg, the Syrian bases were a crucial foothold for the Kremlin’s expansion, and without a viable alternative, the entire logistical network could be at risk, damaging Kremlin interests.[3] In December 2024, Anas el-Gomati, director of the Sadeq Institute, a Libya-based think tank, stated that: “Without a reliable air bridge, Russia’s ability to project power in Africa collapses. The entire operational strategy of Russia in the Mediterranean and Africa is hanging by a thread.”[4]
In the following months, Moscow negotiated with Haftar to gain access to military facilities in Cyrenaica. In exchange for increased military and logistical support, Haftar ceded control of the Maaten al-Sarra military base, which was intended to supply areas such as Mali, Burkina Faso, and Sudan, further solidifying Russian influence in the Sahel.[5]
In this scenario, the Libyan bases, particularly in the eastern part of the country, granted by General Khalifa Haftar, will more likely than not threaten NATO, European and Italian interests.[6]
Intelligence Assessment & Strategic Implications
- Moscow will very likely maintain and consolidate its sphere of influence with the reconstruction of the Maaten base, facilitating its expansion into the Sahel and the sub-Saharan region. This will be particularly true if the Kremlin will secure access to the Tobruk naval base. Additionally, this will likely support Haftar’s future military operations in western Libya.
- Further Russian consolidation in the region will more likely than not destabilise an already chaotic area. Moreover, the recent successes of the Sudanese armed forces against Hemedti’s Rapid Support Forces indicate a realignment of Russian interests in Sudan, more likely than not shifting the regional balance of power.
- The military regimes of the Sahel – Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso – could very likely strengthen their position as Russia’s military allies after the withdrawal of Western, especially French, forces through the strengthening of Russian military bases in Libya. Once fully operational, the Maaten Al-Sarra base will likely become a strategic hub for military operations in these African states.
- The presence of the private military company (PMC) African Corps (or Afrika Korps) in Libya, concentrated around the Haruba base in the East and the peripheral areas of Tripoli, will likely be reinforced by the possible deployment of regular Russian forces and former Syrian military units. This will likely further cement Russia’s role as a security partner for nations under anti-Western military juntas.
- If Europe seeks to identify alternative energy suppliers beyond the Russian Federation’s purview, it will very likely affect its margin of manoeuvre with North African countries and suppliers. The region is abundant in gold and uranium. This shift in the global energy landscape could result in Russia becoming a more influential player, with adverse consequences for Europe.[7]
Conclusion
The potential redeployment of Russian forces to eastern Libya will almost certainly heighten tensions between NATO and Russia. Further destabilisation of the North African region would necessitate increased deployment of forces and resources by NATO and the European Union. These measures, essential for safeguarding EU and NATO interests, could significantly raise the risk of indirect diplomatic confrontation between Moscow and the EU/NATO in the Sahel and North Africa.[8]
[1] “Libia: Haftar Rafforza L’asse Con La Bielorussia E Rilancia La Cooperazione Militare Con Mosca.” Agenzia Nova. February 20, 2025. https://www.agenzianova.com/news/libia-haftar-rafforza-lasse-con-la-bielorussia-e-rilancia-la-cooperazione-militare-con-mosca/
[2] Fox, B. (2024, December 13). Facing loss of its Syrian naval base, Russia shifts focus to Libya. EUobserver. https://www.euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar090e3289
[3] Simon Marks and Katarina Höije, “Russia’s Africa Strategy at Risk After Syria Regime Collapse.” BNN Bloomberg, December 11, 2024. https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/business/2024/12/11/russias-africa-strategy-at-risk-after-syria-regime-collapse/
[4] Simon Marks and Katarina Höije, “Russia’s Africa Strategy at Risk After Syria Regime Collapse.” BNN Bloomberg, December 11, 2024. https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/business/2024/12/11/russias-africa-strategy-at-risk-after-syria-regime-collapse/
[5] “Libya: Russia Increases Its Military and Strategic Presence.” SpecialEurasia. February 4, 2025. https://www.specialeurasia.com/2025/02/04/russia-libya-maaten-al-sarra/ ; Telegram. https://t.me/svezhesti/124702 located in southern Libya near the borders of Chad and the Sahel. Satellite images indicate that the base, which dates back to the 1980s during the Libyan-Chadian war, is undergoing renovations including the restoration of runways and warehouses
[6] Thomas Brambilla, “Russia e Bielorussia Sempre Più Presenti in Libia: i Nuovi Accordi con il Generale Haftar.” InsideOver, February 27, 2025. https://it.insideover.com/politica/russia-e-bielorussia-sempre-piu-presenti-in-libia-i-nuovi-accordi-con-il-generale-haftar.html
[7] “Libya: Russia Increases Its Military and Strategic Presence.” SpecialEurasia. February 4, 2025. https://www.specialeurasia.com/2025/02/04/russia-libya-maaten-al-sarra/
[8] Massimiliano Boccolini, “Armi Dalla Siria Alla Libia. Così Mosca Si Muove in Africa – Formiche.net.” Formiche.net. December 16, 2024. https://formiche.net/2024/12/russia-minaccia-italia-armi-da-siria-a-libia/
Osservatorio Strategico Mediterraneo Allargato 