Osservatorio Strategico Mediterraneo Allargato

Key takeaways

➢ Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan recognised the Republic of Cyprus in early April, aligning with EU positions and marking a major blow to Türkiye’s foreign policy.

➢ Türkiye will likely respond by intensifying nationalist rhetoric and pivoting toward Russia or China to regain leverage.

➢ Central Asian states will likely continue deepening ties with Brussels, viewing Cyprus as a diplomatic “gateway” to the EU.

➢ The EU will very likely capitalise on its momentum by accelerating investment projects through the Global Gateway initiative.

Latest developments:

On April 4th, 2025, three Central Asian countries, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, officially recognised the Republic of Cyprus and established embassies in Nicosia. The recognition came after the first European Union-Central Asia summit, held in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, despite the three countries’ ties in the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS), which is based in Istanbul and promoted mainly by Turkish efforts.

Background

The Organisation of Turkic States was established in 2009 as an intergovernmental institution to boost cooperation and trade between ethnic Turkic countries. Addressing Erdoğan’s pan-Turkic ambitions effectively, the OTS has been leveraged by Türkiye to counterbalance Russia’s influence in Central Asia, and to build the sphere of influence necessary to any growing regional power.^[1]

OTS’s members, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and its observers, Turkmenistan and Hungary, represent crucial economic partners of Türkiye, with their trade jumping from $33 billion to $42 billion just between 2022 and 2023.^[2] However, Central Asian countries’ abundance of energy resources and critical raw materials makes them a highly coveted prize in any strategic agreement.

The European Union’s (EU) interest in this world region is explained by the recent necessity to develop a “Geopolitical Europe”: a EU that is able to confront current international challenges, and “to shape events, rather than be merely driven by them.”^[3] However, securitising natural resources is critical to building a truly international action. The European Union – Central Asia summit proposal answered the EU’s need to establish a stable partnership with resource-rich counterparts.

After the summit, a Joint Declaration was signed, formally upgrading relations to a strategic partnership between the EU and Central Asian states. It established a dedicated dialogue on counterterrorism and violent extremism, outlined a Declaration of Intent focused on securing critical raw materials and building resilient supply chains, and affirmed a shared commitment to inclusive governance in Afghanistan and addressing its humanitarian crisis. The declaration also committed to developing the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor and investing €10 billion through the Global Gateway initiative, emphasising a peaceful South Caucasus as a prerequisite for success. Finally, it reaffirmed respect for international law, territorial integrity, and sovereignty, explicitly referencing UN Security Council Resolutions 541 and 550, which condemned the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).^[4]

By recognising Cyprus and establishing embassies in the country shortly after, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan aligned themselves with EU principles in supporting the Republic of Cyprus’ territorial integrity. The decision represents a significant diplomatic blow to Türkiye’s strategy in Central Asia, minimising the positive return offered by its efforts in the Organisation of Turkic States.

The Central Asian countries’ move is further complicated due to Turkish interests in the Eastern Mediterranean around Cypriot shores: the numerous gas reserves found in the area and the lack of an agreement delimiting the respective Exclusive Economic Zones have led to a vicious circle of conflict and friction. Tensions have recently been heightened by Türkiye’s increasingly assertive stance and the long-standing rivalry between Türkiye and Greece.^[5]

Intelligence Assessment & Strategic Implications

• Türkiye will almost certainly intensify nationalist rhetoric and reassert maritime claims to save face domestically; it is also very likely that Ankara will pivot toward Russia or China to compensate for the erosion of influence in Central Asia, complicating EU and NATO strategic interests.
• The Central Asian countries’ decision will more likely than not open a rift between Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Türkiye, reducing the possibility for further cooperation in foreign policy initiatives.
• It is very unlikely that trade between Türkiye and Central Asian countries will diminish in the future, as Türkiye finds itself in a complicated economic condition, commercial relations with other Turkic states will be essential to the flourishing of its economy. The blow, however, proves that ethnic and cultural ties do not suffice in establishing a strong partnership.
• It is unlikely that Azerbaijan, Ankara’s closest partner, will follow suit: an outcome representing a complete breakdown of Türkiye’s diplomatic coherence in the Turkic world.
• With the new Syrian leadership in Damascus opening a dialogue with Nicosia, thus indirectly acknowledging its statehood and further isolating Turkey’s position on the Cyprus issue, the AKP government’s foreign policy has suffered a serious setback. The strengthening ties between Cyprus and Syria likely contribute to a broader shift in the Eastern Mediterranean’s geopolitical dynamics, leaving Türkiye progressively sidelined. The scenario could, more likely than not, lead to a redefinition of the stance on Cyprus and a more assertive approach to guaranteeing control over energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean, in line with Turkish nationalist rhetoric.
• Central Asian nations will very likely continue to pursue closer relations with the EU: Cyprus serves as a strategic “gateway” to Brussels, with the appeal of tax benefits and access to EU investments driving deeper diplomatic engagement.
• The European Union will very likely seek to consolidate its diplomatic gains by fast-tracking projects under the Global Gateway initiative, particularly in energy corridors and supply chain diversification involving critical raw materials. If the EU-backed Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor is pursued, it could likely diminish Türkiye’s role as a gateway between Asia and Europe if its neighbours are seen as more stable and cooperative partners.

Conclusion

The recognition of the Republic of Cyprus by Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan marks a significant turning point in Türkiye’s regional strategy. This decision not only signals a reorientation of Central Asian states toward the European Union but also reveals the limits of ideological alliances when confronted with geopolitical and economic pragmatism, as fostered by Türkiye. To monitor the situation, special attention should be paid to deepening EU-Central Asia ties, especially in critical raw materials and infrastructure investments. Türkiye’s diplomatic and military responses in the Eastern Mediterranean should be closely observed, along with any shifts in Azerbaijan’s stance on Cyprus. Finally, tracking Ankara’s domestic political rhetoric and its engagement with Russia and China will be essential to find possible reorientations.