Osservatorio Strategico Mediterraneo Allargato

Key Takeaways

➢ The United States have adopted an aggressive posture toward Iran, pursuing a policy of ‘maximum pressure’ and expanding its military presence in the region, very likely to gain leverage in the current nuclear negotiations and weaken Iran’s strategic position.

➢ Iran is unlikely to acknowledge its vulnerabilities publicly, but it is likely to maintain diplomatic channels open for indirect negotiations while engaging in demonstrative displays of military force.

➢ Iran will very likely strengthen ties with China and Russia, forming a deeper diplomatic and economic axis to counterbalance U.S. pressure.

➢ The U.S. is likely to consolidate its partnership with Iraq to reinforce regional influence and exert pressure on Tehran.

Latest Development

On April 19, the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran engaged in a second round of negotiations in Rome, following an initial meeting in Muscat, Oman. The discussions centred on the potential revival of a nuclear agreement.

The U.S. delegation was led by Steve Witkoff, the Special Envoy for the Middle East, while Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi represented the Iranian side. The talks took place at the Embassy of Oman in Rome and were conducted indirectly; the two delegations remained in separate rooms, with Omani Foreign Minister Badr al-Busaidi acting as an intermediary to convey messages between the parties.

Initial feedback from both sides suggested a cautiously optimistic outlook. A subsequent meeting has been scheduled for April 26. In a national TV statement, Araghchi described the atmosphere of the negotiations as “constructive” and reaffirmed Iran’s commitment to diplomacy.
On the U.S. side, President Donald Trump reiterated a firm stance on preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, affirming his non-negotiable position. He simultaneously stated that he wishes to see the country become “great, prosperous, and terrific” – as long as it remains without nuclear weapons.

Following the talks, National Security Council spokesperson Brian Hughes emphasised that although President Trump has authorised both direct and indirect negotiation channels, and “all options remain on the table,” negotiations cannot continue indefinitely.^[1]

Background

Despite the latest Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community – which states that “Iran is not building a nuclear weapon and that Khamenei has not authorised the nuclear weapons program he suspended in 2003”– in November 2024 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) warned that Iran was enriching uranium to near-weapons-grade levels (60% U-235), close to the 90% threshold required for weaponisation.^[2]

On March 7, U.S. President Trump sent a letter through the United Arab Emirates to Supreme Leader Khamenei, setting a two-month ultimatum to engage in direct negotiations aimed at signing a new nuclear deal. Khamenei rejected the proposal on March 12, calling it an act of “deception.”^[3] Consequently, Trump declared that the U.S. would hold Iran directly responsible for any attack by the Houthis and warned of dire consequences. While the official response of the Iranian Supreme Leader has strongly condemned the U.S. coercive methods, Foreign Minister Abba Araghchi adopted a more neutral tone, urging the U.S. to employ diplomatic means rather than military ones and notably not ruling out negotiations. In alignment with Trump’s stance, Mike Waltz demanded that Iran dismantle its nuclear program entirely, including its missiles and weaponisation component.

On March 23, Secretary of State Marco Rubio reiterated U.S. support for Israel during a conversation with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. He reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to ensuring freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and countering both Iran and the Houthis.^[4] On March 27, Iran announced it had submitted a written reply through Oman. The Iranian foreign minister has confirmed that “indirect negotiations can take place as they have in the past.”^[5]

The first round of negotiations took place in Muscat, Oman. It was the first high-level meeting between the two nations since 2018. While emphasising the positive and constructive tone, Iran was also careful to underline the indirect nature of the meeting, mindful of hardline factions at home.^[6] 

Intelligence Assessment & Strategic Implications

• Washington will very likely maintain its aggressive stance toward Iran. This assessment is based on two factors: the politics of ‘maximum pressure’ and asserting military superiority in the area.
  • Firstly, on March 20, the U.S. Department of State imposed new sanctions on entities purchasing and transporting Iranian oil, particularly on Huaying Huizhou Daya Bay Petrochemical Terminal Storage, an oil terminal in China, and on China-based Shandong Shouguang Luqing Petrochemical Co., Ltd., an oil refinery. This action represents the fourth round of sanctions aimed at disrupting Iranian oil revenue. In line with the U.S. maximum pressure campaign, the State Department reiterated that “so long as Iran attempts to generate oil revenues to fund its destabilising activities, the United States will hold both Iran and all its sanctions-evading partners accountable.”^[7]
  • Secondly, CENTCOM has confirmed that the U.S. Air Force has deployed Northrop B-2 Spirit stealth bombers over the military base of Diego Garcia, in the Indian Ocean.^[8] The Pentagon also extended the deployment of the USS Harry S. Truman carrier strike group in the Red Sea, while the Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group arrived in Guam on March 24.^[9] The buildup of forces in the area has served to deter and counter the Houthi militants in Yemen. U.S. officials have confirmed that strikes were carried out on more than 100 targets since April 15.^[10] The deployment of military assets has served as a threat to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities directly if a diplomatic deal is not reached. “We’re dealing with them directly, and maybe a deal is going to be made… doing a deal would be preferable to doing the obvious… If the talks aren’t successful, I think it’s going to be a terrible day for Iran,” Trump declared.^[11]
• Iran is unlikely to acknowledge any strategic weakness publicly and will likely present itself as open to diplomacy, while simultaneously engaging in displays of force, fully aware of its diminished regional influence and the current U.S. position of strength. Iran has seen setbacks: Hamas and Hezbollah have faced military defeats, and the fall of the Assad regime in December further reduced Iranian proxy power. Publicly, Iran has attempted to maintain a posture of defiance, as seen during National Army Day on April 18, when it displayed a Russian-made S-300 air defence system. In addition, a video published on X by Commander Amir Ali and the Chief of Iran’s Armed Forces, Mohammad Hossein Bagheri, showcased an underground missile tunnel system packed with missile engine mobile launchers and other advanced weaponry.^[12] All the previous elements, together with the Supreme Leader and foreign minister declarations, suggest that Iran is likely to maintain a diplomatic posture through its official channels, while simultaneously exerting pressure through demonstrative displays of military force.
• Iran will very likely continue to deepen cooperation with China and Russia. This assessment is grounded in two recent developments: first, on March 10, the three countries held joint naval drills under the “Maritime Security Belt of 2025.”^[13] Both China and Russia have considerable interests in Iran: China remains a major buyer of Iranian oil, despite sanctions, and Russia continues to rely on Iranian drones for use in Ukraine. Second, on March 14, Iranian, Chinese, and Russian officials met in Beijing to discuss the Iranian nuclear issue, advocating for the end of “unlawful” sanctions and emphasising political and diplomatic engagement based on mutual respect. Moreover, Minister Araghchi met his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, on April 18 in Moscow. Lavrov declared that Russia is ready to mediate the nuclear talks, and Araghchi stated at a joint news conference: “We are hopeful, and we expect Russia to continue its supportive role in any new agreement.”^[14]
• It is also likely that the U.S. will further consolidate its relationship with Iraq to fortify its grip over the region and exert additional pressure on Iran. On March 23, Iraq’s National Security Adviser, Qasim al-Araji, met with the U.S. Charge d’Affaires, Daniel Rubinstein, in Baghdad to reaffirm the importance of Iraq’s role in maintaining regional stability, particularly in counterterrorism efforts.^[15]

Conclusion

The United States is very likely to maintain its assertive posture toward Iran, combining the maximum pressure strategy with increased military deployments and airstrikes in the region. This approach is very likely intended to strengthen Washington’s position ahead of any potential nuclear agreement.

It is likely that Iran will remain open to indirect diplomatic engagement while continuing to project strength through controlled displays of military force. Iran is unlikely to acknowledge its strategic vulnerabilities publicly but appears aware of its diminished regional influence.

It is very likely that Iran will deepen its alignment with China and Russia, both economically and militarily. The recent trilateral naval exercises and the diplomatic coordination over nuclear negotiations both reflect a growing strategic convergence.