Osservatorio Strategico Mediterraneo Allargato

Key Takeaways

➢ Support for Hamas is likely to decline further after the war, as evidenced by the late March protests that signalled growing public dissatisfaction in Gaza.

➢ Hamas is likely to keep signalling a willingness to step back from sole governance and engage with other Palestinian factions in a postwar administration. However, Hamas is very likely to be excluded from political participation in a postwar Gaza.

➢ Under the current Netanyahu government, postwar Gaza governance is likely to exclude the participation of all Palestinian factions, with the Israeli Prime Minister possibly considering a longer-term military presence of the IDF in the Gaza Strip and an expansion of the buffer zone between Gaza and Israel.

➢ Qatar and the UAE are more likely than not to reconsider their roles in Gaza. Moreover, normalisation between Israel and Saudi Arabia is likely to remain stalled as long as the conflict continues and any commitment from Israel towards Palestinian statehood is made.

Latest Development

On March 18^th, Israel officially violated the two-month ceasefire by resuming large-scale bombing and ground operations in the Gaza Strip. Following new military operations in the North, preceded by a two-week halt of humanitarian aid, on March 25^th, protests erupted first in Beit Lahia, then in Deir al-Balah. Amid worsening humanitarian conditions, Gazans took to the streets to protest both Israel and Hamas, holding them responsible for the enclave’s destruction and calling for Hamas to step down.

Contemporarily, Netanyahu has announced plans to expand the offensive in the south, including creating the Morag Corridor between Khan Younis and Rafah and remilitarising the Netzarim Corridor in the north.^[1] Observers suggest that these moves may represent an attempt to divide Gaza into three security zones for tighter control and increased pressure on Hamas.^[2]

Background

Since the beginning of the war in October 2023, Israel has killed thousands of militants and significantly weakened Hamas’s capabilities. By September 2024, Israeli officials had already declared Hamas defeated in most of Gaza, reduced to operating as a guerrilla terror group.^[3]

Despite suffering heavy military losses, Israel believes that in recent months, Hamas has enlisted over 20,000 new fighters and is using unexploded Israeli munitions to rig buildings and roads with explosives in anticipation of a renewed Israeli assault.^[4]

While many of Hamas’s top leaders have been killed since the start of the conflict, as of April 2025, two key military commanders – Izz al-Din al-Haddad and Mohammed Sinwar – remain active and are leading efforts to rebuild the group’s capabilities^[5].

Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have been playing an essential role in shaping the future of Hamas and postwar Gaza. Qatar, a key financial backer of Hamas and host to its political bureau, is also the closest U.S. ally in the region, balancing its ties carefully. The UAE, currently the most prominent Arab aid donor to Gaza, appears focused on securing a role in postwar reconstruction. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, rejects Hamas but is pressuring Israel to commit to a two-state solution, making normalisation contingent on that promise.

The March 25^th protests were not the first signs of popular discontent with Hamas, but they were among the most visible, despite not being large-scale. Hamas’s Government Media Office claimed the anti-Hamas slogans were spontaneous and unrepresentative of the broader national sentiment, while still affirming Palestinians’ right to protest.^[6] However, there is growing concern that Hamas may respond with repression^[7], As noted by the director of the Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR), Hamas has never enjoyed majority support in Gaza. A poll from September 2024 already indicated a decline in public support for Hamas governance in Gaza since the war began, with increasing preference for Palestinian Authority control.^[8]

 Intelligence Assessment & Strategic Implications

• Support for Hamas is likely to decline further once the war ends. According to a PCPRS poll, as early as September 2024, only 36% of Gazans said they wanted Hamas to return to power after the war.^[9] However, according to the same poll, if legislative elections were held today with all political options on the table, Hamas would more likely than not still outperform other Palestinian factions. At the same time, support for Fatah rose slightly. However, Marwan Barghouti, not Mahmoud Abbas, would have the highest preference in presidential elections.

• It is more likely than not that Hamas will keep signalling a willingness to step back from sole governance in Gaza and engage with other Palestinian factions in shaping a postwar administration,with the support of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. Some senior Fatah figures have publicly acknowledged the possibility of cooperating with Hamas on postwar governance, leaving contentious issues to be addressed later. Hamas also believes many Fatah supporters in Gaza may be open to participating in a new political framework.

• If the Palestinian Authority is to govern Gaza postwar, Hamas will very likely be excluded from political participation for two main reasons. First, under its current leadership, Hamas must meet strict conditions to join any governing coalition. This includes removing any member linked to the October 7th attacks and recognising Israel – conditions that neither the U.S. nor Egypt and Qatar have managed to secure. Moreover, trust between Hamas and Israel would be extremely low. Some analysts also believe that Hamas may adopt a “Hezbollah model” for Gaza, combining political integration with a covert military wing.^[10] Second, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas is unlikely to accept Hamas’s inclusion. Abbas may fear that Hamas aims to undermine the PLO’s leadership and push for new presidential and general elections, where he would likely face calls to step down.

• If the war is concluded under the current Netanyahu government, postwar governance in Gaza may likely exclude not only Hamas but all Palestinian factions. As early as summer 2024, Netanyahu rejected a U.S. proposal to reinstall the Palestinian Authority in Gaza. With the Trump administration’s disengaged stance on Gaza, Netanyahu now has more freedom to act in line with his political interests. To keep his coalition intact and appease far-right partners, Netanyahu is likely to consider re-occupation and settlement plans. However, the military sustainability of these plans remains uncertain. For now, to gain time, it is likely that Netanyahu will continue the operation in Gaza by seizing more territory to create an extended buffer zone.

• Qatar is more likely than not to reconsider Hamas’ presence on its territory as part of a broader reassessment of its role in mediating the Israel-Hamas conflict to elevate its diplomatic standing with the U.S. and Israel. Qatar’s posture towards Iran – already bolstered by its function as a diplomatic bridge to the West – may shift depending on the position it takes regarding Hamas’s future presence and funding.

• The UAE is more likely than not to play a significant role in Gaza’s reconstruction, regardless of whether postwar governance includes Hamas in a coalition with the Palestinian Authority or not. Abu Dhabi is likely to adopt a wait-and-see approach to Trump’s policy on Tehran. Meanwhile, it is maintaining strategic ties with the U.S and Israel and exploring economic opportunities with Iran.

• Normalisation between Israel and Saudi Arabia is unlikely under the current Israeli government. Riyadh has consistently stated that any such agreement depends on ending the war in Gaza and making progress toward Palestinian statehood—conditions that remain firmly off the table for Netanyahu.

Conclusion

Although popular support for Hamas is likely to decrease further after the war, it remains more likely than not to retain political relevance in future elections. On the other hand, a potential Marwan Barghouti-led Palestinian Authority would be more widely accepted.

Hamas will likely continue signalling its openness to sharing a governance arrangement with other Palestinian factions, but under current conditions, it is very likely to be excluded from any formal political role. Postwar governance under Netanyahu’s leadership is also very likely to marginalise not only Hamas but all Palestinian factions.

Israel is likely to continue military operations in the Strip, aiming to expand control and establish a buffer zone.

Meanwhile, regional actors like Qatar and the UAE are positioning themselves strategically, with reconstruction and diplomacy shaping their future involvement. Normalisation between Israel and Saudi Arabia is likely to remain stalled as long as the conflict continues and no concrete steps are taken, at least publicly, toward Palestinian statehood.