Key Takeaways
➢ The United States has resumed air strikes against the Houthi rebels in Yemen, likely escalating tensions in the region.
➢ The American strikes, supported by Israel, will almost certainly continue in Yemen until the Houthis’ offensive capabilities are neutralized, according to multiple official declarations.
➢ Iran will likely avoid direct involvement in the conflict, as it already faces rising tensions with Washington over its nuclear program.
➢ Regional instability will likely make Red Sea transit more dangerous, likely increasing reliance on the Cape of Good Hope and driving up oil prices.
Latest Development
The new American administration heavily and repeatedly hit Houthis’ positions in Yemen on March 15, 2025.
The Pentagon struck over 30 targets in three days, hitting command sites, drone infrastructure, and weapons facilities.[1] These strikes reflect US President Donald Trump’s aim for an open-ended operation to stop Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.
These strikes are preventive, following Houthi threats to resume attacks unless Israel reopened crossings and allowed humanitarian aid into Gaza – an unlikely scenario. [2]
Background
The Houthis’ ideology and religious ties to Iran positioned them within Tehran’s “axis of resistance,” opposing Israel, the US, and the broader West.[3] Shortly after Hamas’ attack on Israel and the outbreak of war in Gaza in October 2023, the Houthis asked for a ceasefire and declared their support for Palestinian independence. On October 19, the rebels started to attack both Israel and the Israeli ships in the Red Sea. Additionally, for over a year, the group targeted Western-flagged ships from countries that supported Israel.
The relation between the rebel group and Tehran is complex. Over the years, the group has played a key role in pressuring Saudi Arabia into a diplomatic truce with Iran in March 2023. The Houthis now appear to be distancing themselves from Iran, asserting their independent decision-making. By strict definition, the Houthis are not a formal Iranian proxy, as “Iran lacks control over Houthi behaviour and the Houthis are not acting primarily on behalf of Iran.”[4] “The Houthis’ independence from Iran is important because the Houthis are currently more likely than Iran to escalate.”[5] The behaviour of the Houthis is different from Hezbollah that engage in low-intensity attacks on the border, fitting in Tehran’s strategy.
In January 2025, when the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas was reached, the Houthis declared themselves ready to “halt their military operations against Israel as well as commercial ships in the Red Sea if the truce comes into force” after reportedly hitting 91 ships.[6] On March 7, 2025, four days after Israel blocked humanitarian aid to Gaza, Houthi leadership threatened to resume the attacks. The rebels issued a four-day ultimatum. On March 11, the Houthis declared a ban on Israeli ships in the Red Sea; four days later, US strikes resumed.
Intelligence Assessment & Strategic Implications
- The American strikes will almost certainly continue in Yemen until, the Houthis’ offensive capabilities are neutralized, as indicated by the US Secretary of State Marco Rubio. This assessment is a consequence of two main elements: the US administration’s declarations and the latest decision concerning Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO). Firstly, President Trump and spokespersons from the Pentagon have clearly stated that the final objective is to restore peace in a region where 12% of global trade transits, even though the US has not directly felt the consequences. Secondly, on January 22, 2025, President Trump re-designated the Houthis as a FTO, outlining a policy to “eliminate the Houthis’ capabilities and operations, deprive them of resources, and thereby end their attacks on U.S. personnel and civilians, U.S. partners, and maritime shipping in the Red Sea.”[7]
- The Houthi rebels will very likely increase their attacks against US ships and Israeli territory as long as their resources permit. Following the escalation, the IDF intercepted a ballistic missile on March 18. In addition, the Houthis claimed to have launched three attacks in 48 hours against the USS Harry S. Truman carrier group on March 16 and 17, but the Pentagon denied these allegations. The group’s leadership has signalled a likely escalation in response. The American strikes, “bigger than what the Houthis previously experienced,” are likely to boost the group’s recruitment and are unlikely to reduce its willingness to fight.[8]
- Iran will likely avoid any direct involvement in the current fight, at least in public. Tehran is in a difficult position, as Washington has framed these strikes as a direct message to Iran. Secretary Rubio argued that the US would “owe Iran responsible” if the attacks don’t stop immediately. [9] Furthermore, Iran must choose between negotiating its nuclear program or facing an alternative path, possibly military, outlined by President Trump in a letter to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. This dilemma further suggests that Iran is unlikely to involve itself in the Red Sea crisis.
- Israel will very likely continue striking Houthi infrastructure in Yemen, as in 2024. This new scenario forces Israel to operate on two fronts – Gaza and Yemen – making ground operations in Syria unlikely, but more likely than not drone and missiles strikes against Iran.
- Regional instability will likely make Red Sea transit more dangerous. Shipping costs in the region will almost certainly rise due to higher insurance rates, forcing many companies to reroute via the Cape of Good Hope. This uncertainty is likely to drive up oil prices, as 4.4% of global supply transits through the Suez Canal.
Conclusion
The U.S. strike campaign will very likely continue, and the Houthis will very likely escalate and retaliate against US ships and Israel as long as their resources permit. The Houthis are an Iran-backed rebel group, but it is unlikely that Tehran will get directly involved in the situation due to the growing tensions with Washington on the nuclear program. These events are likely to further destabilize the region, alongside the restart of the war in Gaza. The escalation will likely impact Europe and drive up oil prices.
[1] Missy Ryan, “Pentagon says operation targeting Yemen’s Houthis is open-ended,” Washington Post, March 18, 2025, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/03/17/trump-yemen-houthis/.
[2] Justin Salhani, “What’s happening in Yemen? A breakdown of the Houthi-US violence,” Al Jazeera, March17, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/3/17/houthis-us-in-new-spiral-of-violence-everything-to-know.
[3] “US warship shoots down drones fired from Houthi-held Yemen in Red Sea”, BBC, December 4, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67607862.
[4] Allisson Minor, “The danger of calling the Houthis an Iranian proxy,” Brookings, September 3, 2024, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-danger-of-calling-the-houthis-an-iranian-proxy/.
[5] Minor, “Danger of calling,” Brookings, September 3, 2024.
[6] Al Jazeera Staff, “Houthis to halt Israel, Red Sea attacks if Gaza truce comes into force,” Al Jazeera, January 18, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/18/houthis-to-halt-israel-red-sea-attacks-if-gaza-truce-comes-into-force.
“Reported Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden,” Map and List of attacks, Lloyd’s List, accessed March 19, 2025, https://www.lloydslist.com/hot-topics/red-sea-risk/map-and-list-of-attacks.
[7] “President Donald J. Trump Re-designates the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization,” Fact Sheet, The White House, January 22, 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/01/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-re-designates-the-houthis-as-a-foreign-terrorist-organization/.
[8] Salhani, “What’s happening in Yemen? A breakdown of the Houthi-US violence,” Al Jazeera, March17, 2025.
[9] “Secretary of State Marco Rubio with Guy Benson of Fox News Radio,” Press Release, U.S. Department of State, March 17, 2025, https://www.state.gov/secretary-of-state-marco-rubio-with-guy-benson-of-fox-news-radio/
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